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Disclaimers
Generally. I do not write about aesthetics. the philosophy of art. the
visual arts and music. Even literature for its own sake. as a creative act
of human sensibility and imagination. rather than as an exemplar in or
contributor to the history and dissemination ofidcas I am not especially
at home in. The reason is simple. if embarrassing. I have. as they say.
no ear. In music and the visual arts especially. I lack not only knowledge
but feeling and sensibility. I am and remain a man of words. I wa<;
trained-or that was the bit of my training that stuck-to see literature
as making primarily intellectual contributions: developing a theme.
exposing an illusion. providing the case studies on which a science. or
at least an understanding. of human life and social tradition and
interaction could be buill. Literature was insight. 'Too Much Feeling.
Too Little Thought' was the not inappropriate headline that a Sydney
Moming Herald SUb-editor gave to one of my early reviews. My more
imaginative friends who think that literature rests not only on
imagination but on imaging and imagining have continued to shake
their heads sadly.
For me. Art is neither a mere imitation of reality nor necessarily a
celebration of reality. neither an illusion nor a metaphysical
homecoming to psychic or cosmic unity. Art is an exploratioll of
reality, of human nature and its conflicts. capacities and potentialities.
ofcharacter and feeling. of sights and sound and their interrelationship.
of what is and what can or could be. To say this is not to flee from or to
transcend realism or empiricism. The Fido-Fido model of meaning
always was and remains a crude perversion of the way in which
words. let alone phrases and sentences. convey meaning. information.
draw our attention to the worlds within us and around us, enable us to
learn what we did not know before. For things and events. like words.
are infinitely complex. Their content, the true statements that may be
made about them. are inexhaustible; the connections and distinctions
of which they form pans are without end. Yet we can learn a language
even if we can never completely exhaust its potentialities. We can say
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in one word or one sentence more than one thing; characteristically,
we express attitudes as well as and often at the same time a~ striving to
present information with emotional neutrality. We enrich concepts,
from Oedipus and Hamlet to 'businessmen' or Presbyterians, with a
wealth ofhalf-stated implications and allusions; we read past literature
and listen to persisting language in the light of subsequent as well as
previous exposition and commentary. We enrich meaning over space
and over time, just as we can also impoverish it. Those who reject
what I would call a realist or empiricist approach to art derive their
plausibility, it seems to me, from crude, though at one time historically
powerful, models of empiricism that saw it as involved in and aiming
at the collection, classification, of brute facts, of atomistic simples, of
unambiguous meanings and words. Yet what I love about words is
their open-texturedness, their capacity to convey meaning on a scale
and with a complexity and richness that go far beyond the Fido-Fido
relationship. Words convey, evoke and create, not simple mental
pictures, but whole webs of meaning, of interrelated occurrences and
potentialities that make up and point to not the one universe, but an
infinity of them. That is why language can be and is, as Giambattista
Vico saw, a repository of culture-not a mere lexicographica1 tool.
The development oflanguage is the true glory and distinction of homo
sapiens as both doer and thinker. It is the birth of criticism.
Rejecting essentialism
The closing years of the twentieth century are a hell of a time to talk
about art or, for that matter, about almost anything permanent and
important that does not derive its rationale from the acquisition or
saving ofmoney. The comforting doctrine that words have an essential
meaning, that people, institutions and works of art have an essential
character and one overriding interest or function lies in taners. There
is one level at which the rejection of essentialism is perfectly sound. It
has to be replaced by the recognition of pluralism~fcompeting
values, interests, functions and of characteristics or trends pulling in
different directions. Law does not do one thing; it does many things,
often at the expense of each other. The same is true of art as a human
acti vity and of a work of art as a specific whole. There is decorative art
and religious art, the informative illustration and the propaganda
poster, just as there are stirring military marches, music easy to listen
to, triumphal fanfares. We may recognise that a particular work scores
well in the special context and purpose for which it was created: it
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lightens the heaviness of a room. it matches the curtains. it represents
or suggests respectability and solidity. For art that has more than these
limited functions or that welds them. fuses them into a wider ambition.
my Sydney teacher and later colleague, John Passmore, has used the
term 'serious art'.
The distinction between the decorative and the 'serious', the work
of art and the piece of propaganda that is effective-<:onsider only
Mayakovsky and Drecht-is not always easy. Neither is it always
easy to distinguish the novel and therefore striking-consider
Futurist art-from the innovative and important. But in recognising
multiplicity of intentions, of functions, of strivings and values between
would-be artists and within works of art, we are not proclaiming
relativism, we are proclaiming pluralism. We retain, as I believe we
must. a commitment to objectivity in perception, in valuation. in
understanding. even if we can never escape dispute in these matters.
We can recognise and reject one of our leading modem tendencies-
the quest for immediate fame and recognition through shocking.
outraging, striking. making quick and easy impact. Dali, it must he
said. was better than that; many of those exhibited today are not.
Today, many have gone far beyond this to the proclamation of
extremes of cultural. moral and social relativism, to the insistence that
'authenticity'. doing your own thing. is the only stable value and that
the character of art. of literature, is not to be found in any given work
or text but only through reading, deconstructing or leaving it behind to
give it meaning in terms of something outside it: our own subjectivity
or the conscious and unconscious furtherance of ideology, including
words and images. in attempted domination. in the struggle for power.
With that I an} not at home. even though it correctly introduces
complexity into any understanding of a text or work and can bring out
the social context of a work of art. For behind the elevation of
subjectivity. of relativism. I find always the elevation of alleged and
mostly untrue assertions that claim objectivity for themselves.
The concept of the artistic
Passmore's article 'The Dreariness of Aesthetics' 1came as a shock to
many. both in his suggestion that aesthetics may not be as 'scientil1c'
as it would like to be and in his recognition that different art forms
may invite different criteria of excellence or 'beauty'. That is n01 my
problem. My prohlem, rather, is that aesthetics vacillates hetween two
poles. At one end it is a form of abstraction that carries with it none of
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the specificity and excitement. complexity. of life and being. of ob-
jects and spaces. of sound and silence. That we find only in what I will
call the real world which includes the world created by anists. (There
has, of course. been interesting progress and exploration under the
rubric of the cognitive sciences seeking regularities or irregularities in
visual perceptions, auditory perceptions and taste. hoth among indi-
viduals and among cultures. It is perhaps more interesting for its own
sake than for its contribution to the philosophy of an. though it
heightens our appreciation of its structures.) At the other end. aesthet-
ics can be a form of parasitism. presenting us with inept and less
interesting versions of what the anist himself or herself has already
said more directly. more subtly. with more interest. Textbooks of
aesthetics, in shon. are dreary precisely because they are not an.
When they are illuminating. they are like Wittgenstein's ladder, ready
to be kicked away. For the valuable function of art criticism is not to
judge works of art but to make us sec things that are in those works.
actually or potentially, that we might have missed and to point out
what is not there. That is not aphilosophic enterprise. In that sense. the
criticism of music. architecture, of sculpture and of painting, and for
that matter. of embroidery. dress design, of wrought-iron work. may
have common ground and function.
Making a correct statement, telling the truth. getting it right. may
be commendable activities and artists may indulge in them as much as
anyone else active in the life of the mind. But getting it right is not
sufficient to make an serious or commendable a<; an. though getting it
wrong (if we pay careful attention to what 'it' means here) may be
sufficient to disqualify a work of an as serious an or. for that matter.
good an. What else is needed, then? Good an has to be interesting and
not only at first impact. Personally, I believe it has to make us sec. not
cry or pant or relax. Passmore has maintained, I think rightly, that
good serious an is always imaginative, whereas bad serious art is
usually banal or gimmicky or exhibits some other non-imaginative
characteristics. It spouts propaganda. it moralises. it pigeon-holes, it
stereotypes. To a greater extent than artists would like to confess, they
seek impact and reputation in the way dress designers do, hy creating
new fashions or latching on to emerging ones. Fashion which is
nothing but servility to the immediate present is an enemy of an.
Passmore. emphasising all this, nevenheless finds himself unable to
argue that Beauty is Truth and Truth Beauty. For only in the case of
some serious representational an can Passmore find a sense in which
serious an makes us aware of truths, just as in some limited cases art
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makes us aware of the values of moral education. Here, I would argue,
he is wrong: too ready to treat the moral and the aesthetic as distinct
and self-contained 'truths' (as an older generation would have said)
different from empirical truths. There is a line, an artistically imponant
line. between imagination. which always involves insight. and fantasy,
which need not. Ifthere are links between Beauty. Truth and Goodness.
then the principal home of Truth and Goodness. Passmore argues, is
outside the arts. while the principal home of Beauty is often claimed to
he inside serious an and to constitute its defining characteristic. (Of
course. it might be bener to abandon the concepts of Beauty. Truth
and Goodness as substantives and to speak of things as beautiful, true
or good.) Any admirer of great nineteenth-century Russian literature
would find Passmorc's a most puzzling statement indeed. Truth in art
and morals, even in The Bailie Hymn 01 lite Republic-His Truth is
marching on-is not a mere cover for sanctimoniousness. Nor is it in
Tolstoy or Dostoevsky. There are modern critics who prefer, as
Passmore stresses. some phrases like formal values to Beauty. But the
problem goes deeper than that. Is it at all natural in the case of much
serious art that one is ready to admit as being such. to speak of it as
beautiful? The powerful vitality, says Passmore. of Michelangelo's
Captives and Rodin's Burghers 01 Calais does not immediately invite
us to speak of these works as beautiful; neither is T. S. Eliot's The
Wmle ul1Id precisely aheautiful poem. Nor is Iago abeautiful person.
Is the depiction of lago, however, beautiful in precisely the scnse in
which we speak of artistic work as heautiful, powerful, compelling.
vital, truthful and convincing? There are, on the other hand, beautiful
landscapes, beautiful faces. beautiful conligurations and the paintings
of these are all too oftcn strikingly banal and uninteresting. All that
this proves is that beautiful, too, is a complex word and concept, with
its banal usages and its suhtle ones. The central and defining
characteristic of Art, Passmore concludes, is neither Truth nor Beauty,
but Imagination, though one might well respond that imagination is
itself the discovery of new truths that are not merely uncontrolled.
subjective fantasies.
Imagination is not fantasy. Writing science fiction is not itself a
sufficient guarantee that one will create great literature. Painting
flowers that do not exist is not a recipe for exciting pictorial art:
Coleridge's Kubla Khllf/ is-for reasons extraneous to the work itsclt:""-
an intriguing. prohlematic poem, but not a great one. It is c1evl:f,
clever with words, clever in construction. but it needs 1. L. Lowes's
The Road to XmUldu to hecome really interesting. The late Isaac
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Asimov has often been regarded as the doyen of science fiction
writing, creating a whole language and set of parameters within which
it moves, making the future to many people seem interesting and
credible. Yet the most striking thing about his Foundation trilogy is its
banality: the banality of its philosophy of history, of its distinction
between the natural and the social sciences, of its attempt to give an
account of the varieties of human motivation and human character.
Even its mutant, the Mule, may throw Seldon's Plan out of joint, but
neither the Mule nor Asimov would throw any working mind out or
gear with an unsuspected novelty or areal leap of imagination. George
Orwell's 1984, on the other hand, does capture our imagination and
bears witness to Orwell's by not portraying a brave new world or by
leaping into the wholly other. Its strength on the contrary, like the
more subtJe but much lower appeal of Dr Who in the earlier episodes,
lies in its national and temporal specificity. Horror can be British and
in one sense very banal, it can reek of perfectly familiar wartime
drabness, bureaucracy and cabbage, while transcending them in
ruthlessness.
I have stressed in the foregoing pluralism as opposed to relativism
and I shall leave it to others to consider the other side of the coin: the
clarity, integrity and harmony that many classical critics, from Aquinas
to James Joyce (or Stephen Dedalus), require of the work of art. The
concepts are difficult, yet not just mistaken or inappropriate. Let me
here rather mention one other point suggested to me-no doubt much
more subtly-by the late Sam Goldberg. A great work of art-a play
of Shakespeare's, for instance-may derive much ofits impact from a
variety offeatures: poetic feeling, richness and creativity in language,
subtJety in the perception of character, strength in the development of
plot, political and not only psychological insight, dramatic feel. These
could be treated as signs of a first-class writer or mind hut do not
readily lend themselves to the scientific model of the exploration of a
theme.
Beauty, truth and art
Is there a sense in which one can use the word beautiful, not just to
mean one likes it, not on a mere whim, but deeply and profoundly,
being content to be judged as a person by one's liking?
There used to be a great philosophical discussion regarding the
commensurability or incommensurability of beautifuls. Of course, I
could laugh with the best of them at Harold Stewart's telling analysis
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in ARNA of Neville Cardus' penchant for talking about music in
terms of cricket and cricket in terms of music: Stravinsky's last run to
the wicket; Bradman's coda. But why is it that the best pieces of
musical criticism arc not simply played on the piano, except as
entertainment, as was done by Bracket and Hinge? Art histories and
even art criticism that deal with painting may be illustrated, but they
are not painted, even though there is music and there arc pictures that
do make telling points about other music and other pictures, most
frequently by way of parody but not exclusively so. Personally, I
believe that more could be done along these lines. perhaps more as a
sally than as a sustained work. I wish we had more such sallies.
Of course, Dali and Picasso, modernism and post-modernism.
produced artistically and intellectually self-conscious paintings, that
involved more than mere reactions against schools. that incorporated
comments. How far can such comment be structured, worked out. to
make connected points in the manner we are accustomed to with
words? Have artists done this more than I know? Or would they he
able to do it if they tried harder? Much of the history of their discipline,
if I may call it that, was devoted to pictorial representation-a form of
creative endeavour not to be sneezed at any more than we have any
business sneezing at narrative history. Narratives do not write
themselves. Neither do portraits paint themselves. Much recent
endeavour in the Arts, indeed, going back to James Joyce and Marcel
Proust, involves aparticular form ofdiscovery and illumination which
we have come to call a paradigm shift. It is not the imposition of new
subjectivities on old realities. it is the discovery of new aspects of the
material analogous to the Impressionist discovery or at least conscious
bringing to the foreground of light.
Human beings in Joyce and Proust and their attitudes and
recollections turn out to be far more complex, far less unitary and
convention-bound than we had thought. They operate at many levels;
they remember and misremember. But let us also say that there is no
great discovery that cannot be trivialised, that cannot become the stuff
of popular fiction, advertising copy and decorative art. The futurists
may have been fated to that end. Archipenko, Modigliani and Braque
were greater than that. So was Paul KJee who has nevertheless inspired
a whole style of merely clever cartoons. Do we have in the non-verhal
arts that fascinating phenomenon that we get in literature-that
additional content of interpretation and theory that can he poured into
the actual work and its character in the way that we have poured them
into Oedipus Rex, Hamiel. King Lear? Plays that cannot only he
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translated into another culture, as Kurosawa had done with Killg Lear,
but that consistently attract great but varied interpretations.
reinterpretations, and inspire further plays that are not simply banal
copies like the plaster casts of Michelangelo' s David.
On art as contemplation
Aquinas and the young Stephen Dedalus saw the superiority of the
artistic sensibility over other human drives and desires in the fact that
it was satisfied with contemplation: it did not of itself involve the
desire to have. Schopcnhauer in The World as Will a1/d Idea devel-
oped and thus discredited this view. Will wali particular. divisive.
characterised by narrowness of vision, egoism, competition rather
than emulation. Art, above all music for Schopenhauer, because of its
very non-verbalisation, was universal. It surmounted the particular
human being and his or her particularity: it offered. strove toward and
achieved universality.
Before we dismiss this as typically Continental metaphysics. let us
remember that David Hume had some intimation of the extent to
which ethics and culture involve the capacity to universalise. limited
ali it is. Naturally. hy virtue of our constitution, he believed, we are
capable of seeing others as ourselves once more, of wincing when
they are struck. of weeping when they cry. for no other reason hut
empathy. Passmore has emphasised that serious art involves above all
imagination and he remains sceptical of its role in what is otten called
moral education-though much of his own writing on what culture
means to him suggests the opposite. At least a central and important
part of the imagination for which we value art lies precisely, it seems
to me, in its capacity to heighten our perceptiveness, to broaden our
response. to make us see more people as ourselves once more or to
recognise evil for what it is: dangerous. destructive and ineradicable.
Good art makes us sec more deeply and in that it has normally in its
written form and in the outstanding portrait. great superiority over the
television documentary, the film and the photography, no matter how
well done. Anglo-Saxon moral theory has long focused on action and
consequences, on an Aristotelian conception of goods. The Platonic
traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church have concentrated much
more on Beauty and Ugliness of character, on the extent to which
actions arise out of or produce a moral state in the person. Yuri
Zhivago and those he loved would have been dead if it were not for the
unprincipled practicality of Komarovski. But for Zhivago and Pasternak
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and for many Russians, Komarovski has an essence: it is that of being
a scoundrel and everything he does and all those who associated with
him are tainted by it. It is a different conception of the moral life.
more frequently found in serious literature than in serious modem
philosophy.
The war for art
The war for art-on behalf of artistic seriousness, artistic integrity,
artistic achievement-has been fought and has to he fought on con-
stantly shifting fronts. Not only the locale of the battle but the charac-
ter of the enemy, the incursions that have to be repelled. the assump-
tions that have to be rejected. keep changing. Since definition is a
matter of distinction, our conception of art and of the artist' s task keep
changing. There is no high road to art signposted all the way; there is
no utopia where art flourishes and takes possession of all human souls.
If it did. it would become non-art: dreary. unproblematic, uninterest-
ing. That is why would-be utopias-both in literature and in litC-
have put artists and everyone else in uniform. have relied on uniform-
ity instead of variety, harmony in place of pluralism.
If art is connected. as I believe it is, with freedom and universality
then freedom requires plurality of attitudes, desires. institutions and
traditions that cannot be brought to a common market, that cannot he
expressed in a common currency. That is why money as a universal
denominator is a fundamental enemy to art. and why utilitarians are
forced, reluctantly-wriggling all the way. as it were-to say that
push-pin is as good as poetry, especially if the people like it.
Poetry. Matthew Arnold tells us. is a criticism of life. Percy Bysshe
Shelley, a less cautious and more muddled thinker. insists that poetry
is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge. It is that which
comprehends all science and that to which all science must be referred.
It is, at the same time, the root and blossom of all other systems of
thought. It is that from which all springs and which adorns all. But
what, as Passmore has complained. are we to make of the comment hy
Frank Kermode. an able. serious and intelligent critic, when he refers
to Yeats' Byzantium: 'To speak humanly of becoming and knowing is
the task of pure being'? As Passmore puts it, here even the reader
inoculated by much study of bad philosophy calls a halt. Yet Matthew
Arnold is saying something important about poetry and more generally
art. It is an exploration and a criticism of life.
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Art and pluralism
Pluralism complicates any attempted definition. evocation or desaip-
tion of what constitutes art. not only by emphasising the variety of
traditions. beliefs and desires that different persons and societies have.
and that colour. not just their conception of art. but the point and
interest of creativity and imagination. Any serious study of ethics. of
what is involved in both decent conduct and the moral life. requires a
recognition of value pluralism. not just moral conflict between people
and moralities. but conflict between the values espoused in one moral-
ity and the need to find a necessarily unstable balance between such
values or. at least. to take each of them into account. The one institu-
tion. the one tradition. the one person. cannot take its departure from a
summum bonum. or a single defining criterion of good. It would be
forced into arecognition that it values different and competing charac-
ter traits. strivings. satisfactions and social desires. Law must have
certainty and flexibility; the universal rules and adaptations to the
particular case; objective standards and the recognition of social and
subjective contexts that can make these standards seem not wholly
apposite. Morality is in this respect like law. So is the appraisal of
human life that may be involved in literary endeavour. A traditional
novel is an experiment. exploring the ramifications of conflict and
balances in human life. The concrete recognition of these complexi-
ties in the moral life is the distinction between a Dostoevsky and a
Chernachevsky. between the earlier Tolstoy and the later Tolstoy.
between Jane Austen and lIya Erenburg. Just as we cannot satisfy all
desires at once. so we cannot escape the conflict between virtues and
their capacity for becoming vices when pushed beyond certain points.
lltis recognition was the strength of the old moral psychology. much
of it based in religion. Just as there is no handbook for applying moral
truths and precepts. so there is no handbook for creating Art.
Art and 'multiculturalism'
In recent years. there has been much stress on cultural and historical
associations-on ethnicities (like those of the Welsh and the
Durgundians). on tribal groups. their cults and mysteries. and on
respect for the secrets contained in their art. There has been similar
stress on multiculturalism. on the right of groups in a nation-state to
maintain the languages and cultures with which they came to that
state. Not only do they have such right but they enrich the society and
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the state in which they exercise it. They give us the opportunity to
extend and broaden our understanding of humanity and our sympathy
for all that is human. But what we demand ofourselves we should also
demand of them. at least as they become settled and not overwhelmed
by the fear of prejudice and the insecurity of migration or an earlier
despised status. We do not universalise the contribution made by
Homer and Confucius or even by the Greek people and the Chinese
people by learning to eat badly made spanakopita with tomato ketchup.
to like honeyed prawns or disastrously crude springrolls. Care is one
of the contributions that both civilisations have made and we would do
well to absorb that with their food. or the Spanish sense ofdignity with
their music.
Multiculturalism to be serious involves the recognition that different
cultural traditions highlight and examine With more knowledge and
sensitivity particular aspects of human capacity and human experience.
They broaden our knowledge. our sensitivity. our imagination. They
help to make us better people. They do not do so if they simply
substitute one chauvinism for another. The ideal we work toward is
that of making all human beings multicultural. of having them
appreciate and respect for its virtues more than one nation. one language.
history and tradition-more than one 'culture'. This assumes that
behind the 'culturcs' of the anthropologist. there lies a universal
culture. Let me. in conclusion. say something about that.
Culture. as I have written elsewhere. is not. as it is often taken to
be. a random. accidental collection of arts and accomplishments. It is
not-despite much opi nion to the contrary-the expression ofa wholly
distinct national genius. though different nations may cultivate different
talents. Culture above all is not bounded by race and place.
incommunicable to those who do not share your experience. The same
is true of Art. It is not a principle of division. but a basis for
communication. responsiveness. cross-cultural admiration and
emulation. It requires. let it be said frankly. intelligence and education
rather than self-aggrandizemcnt and a demotic cgalitarianism. It may
be culturally enriching; it is not politically serviceable in a society
reluctant to draw distinctions.
Some of you will remember James McAuley's 'Jindyworo-
baksheesh' :
By the waters of Bahylon
I heard a Puhlic Works official say:
'A culture that is truly Babylonian
Has !leen on.lcrcd for delivery today'.
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By the waters of Babylon
A quiet noise of subsidies in motion.
'To a bald or mangy surface we apply
Our sovereign art-provoking lotion'.
By the waters of Babylon I heard
That art was for the people; but they meant
That art should sweeten to the people's mouth
The droppings from the perch of government.
Another fine poct, the American Archibald MacLeish, in his
'Invocation to the Social Musc', uttered a parallel warning: Poets are
whores, Fraulein. They sleep with stragglers from hoth camps and are
forbidden by the rules to mix in the manoeuvres of either. It is not
fashionable these days, nor was it fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s,
to decry literature that was engage. Yet serious literature, even if it
tries to be engage, somehow fails precisely in its political message.
Are Orecht's plays and some of his poems serious literature? I should
think not. Culture, in shol1, is the ability to transcend one's situation,
one's place and time, one's language and traditions. It is no accident
that so many of the greatest makers and shapers of the cultures on
which nations pride themselves were marginal men or women. of
mixed race or nationalities, of recent immigrant background, or of
socially ambiguous position. Being on the margins can be soul-
destroying, but it can also sharpen perception, increase ambition.
widen imagination. The artist is declasse. There are exceptions, some
very distinguished exceptions indeed, but they do not constitute a
movement or a trend.
Culture rcsts on the motto that nothing human is alien to me; it
thrives on admiration for, and emulation of, the most penetrating and
sensitive that has becn thought and said, felt and done. anywhere. It
finds that in Europc and in Asia. in Israel and in Dahylon. Culture
promotes intellectual development and moral understanding, it enriches
lives and minds, through knowledge, criticism. imagination and
sensibility. It judges with compassion but also with precision. It
recognises complexity without losing a sense oforder and direction: it
grasps the reality, the power and intensity. of evil and irrationality
without helplessly surrendering before them. or denying that they are
properly called evil or irrational. It has room for both Ariel and
Caliban, and knows that human beings arc both and neither. Culture
thrives not on the joyful, but passive. surrender to nature, or the
'pcople' or the sense of nationhood, but on asphalt and overcrowding,
on creative tensions between suffering and hope, pride and despair.
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anxiety and ambition. nationalism and internationalism; it rests. like
revolution. on reality-centred but unsatisfied longings, on a delicate
balance between denial and affirmation, criticism of. and respect for.
the traditions and society in which the cultured person lives. Is it
perverse to say the same of art? The contexts and conditions of culture
and of art are neither easily characterised nor capable. by themselves,
of guaranteeing or even producing culture and Art themselves. It
appears in the most surprising and unexpected times and places and
we see the conditions that helped to produce it. for the most part. only
with hindsight. For culture and Art are not only firmly international in
their nature and effects, they make people and peoples 'transcend'
themselves and their seemingly narrow, time- and space-bound,
capacities. Culture and Art draw them. or are constituted by their
being drawn. into acontinuing world-wide Republic of Art and Leners,
knowledge and imagination; this gives them a universal, both cosmic
and human, dimension that transcends, without denying, both their
historical period and their geographical location.
Art. in short, is not to be set over and against culture-what is now
called high culture-it is part of it.
Note
J. A. Passmore. 'The Dreariness of A:sthetics·. tEsthetics and Language.
cd. WIlham Elton. Oxford. 1954. pp.36-55.
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